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Description
The Java programing language was implemented in such a way as to limit the amount of possible ways that a program written in Java could be exploited. Unfortunately, all of the protections and safeguards put in place for Java can be circumvented if a program created in Java utilizes internal or external libraries that were created in a separate, insecure language such as C or C++. A secure Java program can then be made insecure and susceptible to even classic vulnerabilities such as stack overflows, string format attacks, and heap overflows and corruption. Through the internal or external libraries included in the Java program, an attacker could potentially hijack the execution flow of the program. Once the Attacker has control of where and how the program executes, the attacker can spread their influence to the rest of the system.
However, since these classic vulnerabilities are known weaknesses, special types of protections have been added to the compilers which create the executable code and the systems that run them. The most common forms of protection include Address SpaceLayout Randomization (ASLR), Non-eXecutable stack (NX Stack), and stack cookies or canaries. Of course, these protections and their implementations vary depending on the system. I intend to look specifically at the Android operating system which is used in the daily lives of a significant portion of the planet. Most Android applications execute in a Java context and leave little room for exploitability, however, there are also many applications which utilize external libraries to handle more computationally intensive tasks.
The goal of this thesis is to take a closer look at such applications and the protections surrounding them, especially how the default system protections as mentioned above are implemented and applied to the vulnerable external libraries. However, this is only half of the problem. The attacker must get their payload inside of the application in the first place. Since it is necessary to understand how this is occurring, I will also be exploring how the Android operating system gives outside information to applications and how developers have chosen to use that information.
However, since these classic vulnerabilities are known weaknesses, special types of protections have been added to the compilers which create the executable code and the systems that run them. The most common forms of protection include Address SpaceLayout Randomization (ASLR), Non-eXecutable stack (NX Stack), and stack cookies or canaries. Of course, these protections and their implementations vary depending on the system. I intend to look specifically at the Android operating system which is used in the daily lives of a significant portion of the planet. Most Android applications execute in a Java context and leave little room for exploitability, however, there are also many applications which utilize external libraries to handle more computationally intensive tasks.
The goal of this thesis is to take a closer look at such applications and the protections surrounding them, especially how the default system protections as mentioned above are implemented and applied to the vulnerable external libraries. However, this is only half of the problem. The attacker must get their payload inside of the application in the first place. Since it is necessary to understand how this is occurring, I will also be exploring how the Android operating system gives outside information to applications and how developers have chosen to use that information.
ContributorsGibbs, William (Author) / Doupe, Adam (Thesis advisor) / Wang, Ruoyu (Committee member) / Shoshitaishvilli, Yan (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020