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In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may

In accordance with the Principal Agent Theory, Property Right Theory, Incentive Theory, and Human Capital Theory, firms face agency problems due to “separation of ownership and management”, which call for effective corporate governance. Ownership structure is a core element of the corporate governance. The differences in ownership structures thus may result in differential incentives in governance through the selection of senior management and in the design of senior management compensation system. This thesis investigates four firms with four different types of ownership structures: a public listed firm with the controlling interest by the state, a public listed firm with a non-state-owned controlling interest, a public listed firm a family-owned controlling interest, and a Sino-foreign joint venture firm. By using a case study approach, I focus on two dimensions of ownership structure characteristics – ownership diversification and differences in property rights so as to document whether there are systematic differences in governance participation and executive compensation design. Specifically, I focused on whether such differences are reflected in management selection (which is linked to adverse selection and moral hazard problems) and in compensation design (the choices of performance measurements, performance pay, and in stock option or restricted stock). The results are consistent with my expectation – the nature of ownership structure does affect senior management compensation design. Policy implications are discussed accordingly.
ContributorsGao, Shenghua (Author) / Pei, Ker-Wei (Thesis advisor) / Li, Feng (Committee member) / Shen, Wei (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2015
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Description区块链技术应用(DApp)最早出现在数字货币交易上,也有部分DApp涉及游戏、音乐、教育、出行等场景,但是由于前几年DApp还属于新生事物,多数社会大众对其了解程度不高,加之多数DApp开发和优化的水平有限,用户体验较差,因此并没有良好的市场表现。

尽管如此, 2017年11月一款叫CryptoKitties的区块链游戏正式上线,并且在短时间之内引爆了整个区块链,游戏交易量在1个月内暴涨至1.7万。随后风险资本不断进入区块链行业,并且催生出一大批区块链DApp出来,涉及的应用场景进一步拓展到游戏、赌博、社交、金融、市场、保险、健康等领域。如何设计一套有效的治理机制,从而实现用户留存高、项目前景好,成为多数区块链DApp最为关注的问题。

本文选择CryptoKitties、Mycryptohero、Steemit和NeoWorld这四款区块链DApp作为案例研究对象,通过归纳总结发现这四款DApp都将游戏性、通证经济、社群生态和网络效应作为共同的治理方式。基于这四方面,本文对四款DApp的异同进行了跨案例比较,发现NeoWorld要比其他三款DApp在治理手段上更加丰富和合理。最后,利用136份NeoWorld玩家调查问卷数据,对游戏性、通证经济、社群生态和网络效应对其治理绩效的影响进行了实证检验,结果发现除了社群生态之外,其他三个因素都能提升NeoWorld的治理绩效。

本研究的最大创新是选择在区块链场景应用中具有代表性的4个DApp项目作为案例研究对象,通过归纳总结发现各自在治理手段上的共同之处(影响因素),并根据问卷调查数据对不同影响因素对特定Dapp治理绩效的影响程度进行实证检验,丰富了平台治理相关研究成果,也为社会各界深化认识DApp治理方式和成效,推动DApp行业生态健康有序发展提供参考和借鉴。

关键词:通证经济;社群生态;网络效应;跨案例研究;回归分析
ContributorsHe, Xin (Author) / Shao, Benjamin (Thesis advisor) / Hu, Jie (Thesis advisor) / Zheng, Zhiqiang (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2020
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Description随着科创板、注册制出台,企业间的竞争逐步从资源型竞争转向科技和技术的竞争,大量有知识、有文化、有理想、有技术的人才涌入社会,给科技发展、技术创新在政策、市场和人才层面提供了支撑、机遇和源动力,科技型创新企业大量涌现,形成趋势性上升行业。科技型创业企业多冠以“规模小、技术密集、高成长、高风险”的标签,在融资过程中困难重重,这些特点与风险投资(VC)“高风险、高回报”的特质不谋而合,VC机构还能给被投企业提供人才、信息、商业模式、政策法律咨询等增值服务,助力企业发展。引入VC走上市路径成为诸多科技型创业企业最优选择。 近些年VC行业在我国得到迅猛发展,IVC和CVC已成了助推我国科技型创业企业发展的主力军。由于IVC和CVC的组织架构、投资期限、资金来源、投资目标、投资经验、管理层薪资结构等方面存在着很大的不同。不同的投资模式势必会对被投企业的经营活动产生不同影响,本文基于总资产单位产出和投入为经济学逻辑,针对相关变量提出假设。 本文对我国中小板和创业板2013年以前上市的七个高新技术行业(5G通信、大数据、人工智能、软件服务、生物制药、新材料、医疗器械)共123家,以上市为起点的6年企业数据为基础。以IVC和CVC为自变量,以上市司龄、企业规模、行业控制、分红占净利润比为控制变量,以V/A、E/A、K/A和E/R为因变量,对IVC和CVC投入的科技型创业企业分别进行描述性统计、相关性分析和回归分析,验证IVC和CVC对被投企业的市场维度(V/A)、财务维度(E/A、E/R)、创新维度(K/A)的影响。试图从企业的角度出发,理清企业与VC的关系,为二级市场投资者提供一个投资决策视角。
ContributorsZhang, Mingpeng (Author) / Shen, Wei (Thesis advisor) / Jiang, Zhan (Thesis advisor) / Hu, Jie (Committee member) / Arizona State University (Publisher)
Created2021