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201176 https://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.2.N.201176 http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ All Rights Reserved 2025 99 pages Doctoral Dissertation Academic theses en Ma, Ying Shen, Wei Chen, Xin Zhang, Harold Arizona State University Partial requirement for: D.B.A., Arizona State University, 2025 Field of study: Business Administration Executive equity incentives and employee stock ownership plans, as long-term incentive mechanisms for listed companies to employees, have gradually attracted widespread attention from researchers in recent years. However, the current academic research on equity incentives seems to focus only on listed companies, and there is little research on the impact of equity incentives on company performance before listing. This paper uses the draft equity incentive plans issued by companies listed on the Growth Enterprise Market from January 1, 2021 to December 31, 2022 as a sample to study the motivation and incentive effect of Chinese companies implementing equity incentives before listing, and puts forward policy recommendations.The empirical results of this paper show that companies with high growth, stronger cost control capabilities, and younger employee age structures are more inclined to implement equity incentives before listing; implementing equity incentives before listing will significantly improve the company's performance before listing, and the shareholding method in the incentive plan will significantly affect the implementation effect of equity incentives. The incentive method of indirect shareholding is more effective than direct shareholding; the early entry of private equity funds and the strategic emerging industries to which the company belongs will weaken the implementation effect of equity incentives. The main contribution of this paper is to study the motivation of listed companies to choose equity incentives before listing based on China's unique institutional background, and analyze the final implementation effect of equity incentives. This paper has comprehensively sorted out the internal logic of equity incentives affecting corporate performance, enriched the literature in the field of corporate executive equity incentives and employee stock ownership plans, and has important implications for the design of corporate incentive contracts, the improvement of market supervision systems, and the recognition of potential risks for investors in my country. Business Administration Companies planning to go public equity incentives GEM Motivation performance growth Research on The Antecedents and Consequences of Equity Incentive before Listing: Based on the Growth Enterprise Market