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171575 https://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.2.N.171575 http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ All Rights Reserved 2022 248 pages Doctoral Dissertation Academic theses Text eng LaTourelle, Jonathan Jacob Creath, Richard Van Gelderen, Elly Robert, Jason Ellison, Karin Becker, D. Vaughn Arizona State University Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2022 Field of study: History and Philosophy of Science Moral status questions, (who and what counts morally) are of central concern to moral philosophers. There is also a rich history of psychological work exploring the topic. The received view in psychology of moral status accounts for it as a function of other mind perception. On this view, entities are morally considerable because they are perceived to have the right sort of minds. This dissertation analyzes and tests this theory, pointing out both empirical and conceptual issues with the received view. The results presented show that important moral intuitions (for example about unjustifiable interpersonal killing) cannot be explained by appealing to other mind perception. Some alternative views of the psychology of moral status are presented, as well as avenues for further research. Philosophy of Science Psychology Ethics Experimental Philosophy Moral Philosophy Moral Psychology moral status Philosophy of Science Murdering and Murderable Minds Experiments and Remarks on the Psychology of Moral Status