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151094 https://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.15118 http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ All Rights Reserved 2012 iii, 67 p Masters Thesis Academic theses Text eng Gilliland, Ted Perrings, Charles Abbott, Josh K Kinzig, Ann P Arizona State University Partial requirement for: M.S., Arizona State University, 2012 Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-67) Field of study: Biology Environmental agencies often want to accomplish additional objectives beyond their central environmental protection objective. This is laudable; however it begets a need for understanding the additional challenges and trade-offs involved in doing so. The goal of this thesis is to examine the trade-offs involved in two such cases that have received considerable attention recently. The two cases I examine are (1) the protection of multiple environmental goods (e.g., bundles of ecosystem services); and (2) the use of payments for ecosystem services as a poverty reduction mechanism. In the first case (chapter 2), I build a model based on the fact that efforts to protect one environmental good often increase or decrease the levels of other environmental goods, what I refer to as "cobenefits" and "disbenefits" respectively. There is often a desire to increase the cobenefits of environmental protection efforts in order to synergize across conservation efforts; and there is also a desire to decrease disbenefits because they are seen as negative externalities of protection efforts. I show that as a result of reciprocal externalities between environmental protection efforts, environmental agencies likely have a disincentive to create cobenefits, but may actually have an incentive to decrease disbenefits. In the second case (chapter 3), I model an environmental agency that wants to increase environmental protection, but would also like to reduce poverty. The model indicates that in theory, the trade-offs between these two goals may depend on relevant parameters of the system, particularly the ratio of the price of monitoring to participant's compliance cost. I show that when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance cost is higher, trade-offs between environmental protection and poverty reduction are likely to be smaller. And when the ratio of monitoring costs to compliance costs is lower, trade-offs are likely to be larger. This thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the trade-offs faced by environmental agencies that want to pursue secondary objectives of protecting additional environmental goods or reducing poverty. Environmental economics Natural Resource Management Wildlife conservation Ecosystem Services Payments for ecosystem services Poverty Principal-agent models Ecosystem Management Social responsibility of business Ecosystem services--Finance. Ecosystem Services Two essays on the trade-offs between multiple policy objectives of environmental management efforts