2026-05-22T01:34:48Zhttps://keep.lib.asu.edu/oai/requestoai:keep.lib.asu.edu:node-1322892024-12-18T20:58:30Zoai_pmh:alloai_pmh:repo_items132289
https://hdl.handle.net/2286/R.I.53122
http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
2019-05
21 pages
eng
Hsieh, Yee-Yang
Foster, William
Douglas, Kacey
Economics Program in CLAS
School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences
Barrett, The Honors College
Text
Since Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez’s influential paper in 2003 that<br/>merges school choice and mechanism design, research in the rapidly<br/>growing school choice literature has been mainly focused on the<br/>design of mechanisms with desirable properties or more realistic<br/>assumptions. However, lab experiments often show that subjects do<br/>not report preferences according to the experimenters’ expectation,<br/>and the experiments rarely provide an in-depth analysis of why the<br/>subjects behave in such confounding ways. My thesis formulates<br/>preference reporting in school choice as a game by incorporating a<br/>payoff schedule and proposes mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as a<br/>way to predict preference reporting.
School Choice
Mechanism Design
Economics of Education
Game Theory
School choice: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as a way to predict preference reporting