A Computational Analysis on the Efficacy of Independent Redistricting Commissions

Gerrymandering involves the purposeful manipulation of districts in order to gain some political advantage. Because legislators have a vested interest in continuing their tenure, they can easily hijack the redistricting process each decade for their and their political party's benefit. This threatens the cornerstone of democracy: a voter’s capability to select an elected official that accurately represents their interests. Instead, gerrymandering has legislators to choose their voters. In recent years, the Supreme Court has heard challenges to state legislature-drawn districts, most recently in Allen v. Milligan for Alabama and Moore v. Harper for North Carolina. The highest court of the United States ruled that the two state maps were gerrymandered, and in coming to their decision, the 9 justices relied on a plethora of amicus briefs- one of which included the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method, a computational method used to find gerrymandering. Because of how widespread gerrymandering has become on both sides of the political aisle, states have moved to create independent redistricting commissions. Qualitative research regarding the efficacy of independent commissions is present, but there is little research using the quantitative computational methods from these SCOTUS cases. As a result, my thesis will use the Markov Chain Monte Carlo method to answer if impartial redistricting commissions (like we have in Arizona) actually preclude unfair redistricting practices. My completed project is located here: https://dheetideliwala.github.io/honors-thesis/