Description
In this dissertation, I study strategic communication, in which a sender strategically discloses information to persuade a receiver to take an action favorable to the sender. I study two models of constrained communication. The first one generalizes the standard Bayesian Persuasion model to allow for the receiver's strategic behavior.
Copyright Statement
Download count: 0
Details
Contributors
- Escobar, Marco Eugenio (Author)
- Manelli, Alejandro M (Thesis advisor)
- Chade, Hector A (Committee member)
- Kleiner, Andreas (Committee member)
- Arizona State University (Publisher)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2022
Subjects
Resource Type
Collections this item is in
Note
- Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2022
- Field of study: Economics