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This dissertation discusses the Cournot competition and competitions in the exploitation of common pool resources and its extension to the tragedy of the commons. I address these models by using

This dissertation discusses the Cournot competition and competitions in the exploitation of common pool resources and its extension to the tragedy of the commons. I address these models by using potential games and inquire how these models reflect the real competitions for provisions of environmental resources. The Cournot models are dependent upon how many firms there are so that the resultant Cournot-Nash equilibrium is dependent upon the number of firms in oligopoly.

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    Date Created
    • 2017
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  • Text
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    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (pages 124-128)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Applied mathematics for the life and social sciences

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    by Robert H. Mamada

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