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Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and

Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms. More specifically, agency theory and theories within competitive dynamics provide competing hypotheses about when and why managers would disclose inside information about their firms.

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    Date Created
    • 2017
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (pages 89-109)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

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    by John R. Busenbark

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