Description
Managers’ control over the timing and content of information disclosure represents a significant strategic tool which they can use at their discretion. However, extant theoretical perspectives offer incongruent arguments and incompatible predictions about when and why managers would release inside information about their firms.
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Contributors
- Busenbark, John R (Author)
- Certo, S. Trevis (Thesis advisor)
- Semadeni, Matthew (Committee member)
- Cannella, Albert (Committee member)
- Arizona State University (Publisher)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2017
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Note
- Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2017Note typethesis
- Includes bibliographical references (pages 89-109)Note typebibliography
- Field of study: Business administration
Citation and reuse
Statement of Responsibility
by John R. Busenbark