Description

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing

Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) whose observed personal option-holding patterns are not consistent with theoretical predictions are variously described as overconfident or optimistic. Existing literature demonstrates that the investment and financing decisions of such CEOs differ from those of CEOs who do not exhibit such behavior and interprets the investment and financing decisions by overconfident or optimistic CEOs as inferior. This paper argues that it may be rational to exhibit behavior interpreted as optimistic and that the determinants of a CEO’s perceived optimism are important.

Reuse Permissions
  • 1.25 MB application/pdf

    Download count: 0

    Details

    Contributors
    Date Created
    • 2016
    Resource Type
  • Text
  • Collections this item is in
    Note
    • Partial requirement for: Ph.D., Arizona State University, 2016
      Note type
      thesis
    • Includes bibliographical references (pages 54-55)
      Note type
      bibliography
    • Field of study: Business administration

    Citation and reuse

    Statement of Responsibility

    by Richard Walton

    Machine-readable links