Description
Since Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez’s influential paper in 2003 that
merges school choice and mechanism design, research in the rapidly
growing school choice literature has been mainly focused on the
design of mechanisms with desirable properties or more realistic
assumptions. However, lab experiments often show that subjects do
not report preferences according to the experimenters’ expectation,
and the experiments rarely provide an in-depth analysis of why the
subjects behave in such confounding ways. My thesis formulates
preference reporting in school choice as a game by incorporating a
payoff schedule and proposes mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as a
way to predict preference reporting.
merges school choice and mechanism design, research in the rapidly
growing school choice literature has been mainly focused on the
design of mechanisms with desirable properties or more realistic
assumptions. However, lab experiments often show that subjects do
not report preferences according to the experimenters’ expectation,
and the experiments rarely provide an in-depth analysis of why the
subjects behave in such confounding ways. My thesis formulates
preference reporting in school choice as a game by incorporating a
payoff schedule and proposes mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as a
way to predict preference reporting.
Details
Title
- School choice: Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium as a way to predict preference reporting
Contributors
- Hsieh, Yee-Yang (Author)
- Foster, William (Thesis director)
- Douglas, Kacey (Committee member)
- Economics Program in CLAS (Contributor)
- School of Mathematical and Statistical Sciences (Contributor)
- Barrett, The Honors College (Contributor)
Date Created
The date the item was original created (prior to any relationship with the ASU Digital Repositories.)
2019-05
Resource Type
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