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The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which players are located on an infinite square lattice.

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    Date Created
    • 2014-08-19
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Identifier
    • Digital object identifier: 10.1214/EJP.v19-3126
    • Identifier Type
      International standard serial number
      Identifier Value
      1083-6489

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    Evilsizor, Stephen, & Lanchier, Nicolas (2014). Evolutionary games on the lattice: best-response dynamics. ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF PROBABILITY, 19, article 74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/EJP.v19-3126

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