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Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of

Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma.

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    Date Created
    • 2015
    Resource Type
  • Text
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    Identifier
    • Digital object identifier: 10.5751/ES-07772-200412
    • Identifier Type
      International standard serial number
      Identifier Value
      1708-3087
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    Baggio, J. A., Rollins, N. D., Pérez, I., & Janssen, M. A. (2015). Irrigation experiments in the lab: trust, environmental variability, and collective action. Ecology and Society, 20(4). doi:10.5751/es-07772-200412

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