**Moral Intuitions and Smart Growth: Why Do Liberals and Conservatives View
Compact Development So Differently?**

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ABSTRACT:

Political liberals are significantly more supportive than conservatives toward walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods, transit-oriented development, and other aspects of the “compact city,” not just in their views about government policy toward metropolitan development but also in their consumption preferences regarding neighborhoods. I argue that social psychologists’ theory of *moral intuitionism* helps account for these differences. In this view, liberals and conservatives emphasize different sets of affective, emotion-laden moral impulses – such as those involving fairness, purity, or ingroup loyalty – predisposing them toward particular reactions to compact development. Political ideologies also are associated with different personality traits that are relevant to opinions on the built environment. To explore the intuitionist hypothesis, I review qualitative accounts that suggest an association between certain moral worldviews and attitudes toward development patterns. I then conduct multivariate analysis of a public opinion survey that contained questions relevant to moral foundations and to views on compact development.

KEYWORDS:

compact development, smart growth, moral foundations theory, social intuitionism

Compact development, sometimes called “smart growth,” initially would not appear to be an obvious candidate for an ideologically polarizing issue. Though many political liberals have embraced compact growth, noting its potential environmental and equity benefits, one might also anticipate that free-market conservatives would support eliminating the strict government regulations such as density restrictions and single-use zoning that tend to lead to traditional suburban sprawl.

Nevertheless, recent empirical research demonstrates that liberal versus conservative political ideology is one of the most significant, weighty correlates of individual attitudes toward compact development. Moreover, ideology is predictive not only of policy attitudes (e.g., whether government should direct new growth toward older centers) but also predicts consumption preferences (e.g., the desire to live in a walkable or transit-oriented neighborhood) (Lewis & Baldassare, 2010). What renders this issue, conceivably a topic of consensus, so divisive?

I suggest in this article that we are looking in the wrong place if we expect people’s preferences on land-use policy to emerge whole-cloth from coherent reasoning about government’s role in the economy, or even from individuals’ views of financial self-interest or environmental concern. Rather, I draw on insights from an emerging body of literature in social psychology and political behavior to help explain the liberal/conservative split on the built environment. This perspective suggests that intuition-based, emotion-laden impulses – a relatively automatic or “gut” morality rather than high-level cognitive reasoning – underlie many left/right differences. In the case at hand, I suggest that these impulses play a significant role in structuring attitudes toward

land use and metropolitan development. In this view, the different sets of preferences for living environments associated with the political left and right emerge in part from the fundamentally different “moral intuitions” these groups have about what is the “right” or “correct” way to live in an urbanized society. At the same time, these different intuitions provoke significant differences between liberals and conservatives in the types of moral outrage they harbor toward actors or development patterns that are seen as violating their values. It is also likely that these different views of the built environment reflect differences in personality traits that are themselves associated with allegiance to the political left or right.

In sum, this project aims to bring together insights from political science, psychology, social neuroscience, and urban planning to help understand the ways in which the public might embrace or fail to embrace land-use reforms. Admittedly, the availability of empirical evidence that could directly support or disconfirm the hypothesis is limited at this point. I will draw from public opinion survey data as well as more fragmentary qualitative evidence to suggest support for the moral-intuitionist perspective on land-use attitudes. In the concluding section, I describe how the question might be investigated more systematically in future research.

THE PUZZLE: WHY IS COMPACT DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLITICAL LEFT?

Proponents have embraced “smart growth,” which I call by the more neutral term *compact development*, as a set of land-use reforms that in their view promises to improve the livability and environmental sustainability of metropolitan areas, increase social

equity, and achieve economic efficiencies. These so-called “three E’s” of sustainable metropolitan development (environment, equity, economy) are often viewed as broadly appealing to diverse constituencies (Congress for the New Urbanism, 2001; Chen, 2000; Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001; Brundtland, 1987). The supposedly broad appeal of smart growth is thought to lie in its embrace of goals traditionally associated with the political left (social equity and increased opportunity for residents of older neighborhoods), the political right (economic competitiveness and allocative efficiency in land use), and other seemingly universal or apolitical goals (enhanced livability and preservation of farmland and open spaces). By targeting infrastructure investments and new development to existing centers and built-up areas, by creating more walkable, dense, and transit-accessible environments, and by avoiding wanton development at the metropolitan fringe, all of these goals can be furthered, or so the argument goes.

Empirical research on public attitudes, however, suggests that Americans are of mixed and perhaps somewhat self-contradictory opinions about the land-use changes suggested by proponents of compact development (Audirac, 1999; Morrow-Jones, Irwin, & Rowe, 2004; Handy et al., 2008; Lewis & Baldassare, 2010). Although many respondents in surveys and interviews favor certain compact-development alternatives to traditional suburban development, there are a variety of cleavages among the public in support for these land-use reforms. Some of these cleavages center around sociodemographic characteristics, such as gender, income, race, age, and the presence of children in the household. But more important for our purposes, political ideology (usually self-reported on a liberal-conservative scale) also is often strongly associated with land-use opinions.

For example, Lewis and Baldassare (2010) reported on two public opinion surveys that collectively covered large, representative samples of five western states. In both surveys, respondents were asked to assess tradeoffs between four pairs of alternatives:

- Living in areas with small yards and short commutes versus areas with large lot sizes and long commutes
- Living in mixed-use, walkable areas versus residential-only, auto-oriented areas
- Living in high-density neighborhoods with transit accessibility versus low-density, driving-oriented neighborhoods
- Supporting infill policies and land preservation versus fringe development and avoidance of density and congestion.

When respondents' opinions were cross-tabulated with self-described ideology, it was found that liberals' support for each of the compact-development alternatives in these four pairs of tradeoffs exceeded support among conservatives by a substantial margin (Lewis & Baldassare, 2010, p. 233). The liberal/conservative gap ranged from 9 to 22 percentage points, as illustrated in Figure 1. Even when controlling in multivariate analyses for a wide variety of individual characteristics and perceptions, conservatism was associated with a reduction of about 10% in the probability of supporting each of the compact-development alternatives. Moreover, the consistency of this tendency was notable: Among the many individual characteristics examined, only political ideology was consistently a significant predictor of land-use opinion across the four trade-off questions, and always in the same direction. Lewis and Baldassare (2010) also found that it was conservatives who appeared to be most distinctive, as their opinions differed from

those of self-described moderates to a greater degree than liberals' views differed from moderates' views.

[Figure 1 about here]

Results of other studies of public attitudes similarly revealed significant gaps between liberals and conservatives in views toward various dimensions of compact development. Handy et al. (2008) found that liberal attitudes toward social issues (but not financial issues) were associated with support for “traditionally designed communities,” which were described in terms similar to New Urbanist principles. Mohamed (2008) showed that the combination of preserving open land and redeveloping cities, a set of preferences roughly congruent with compact development, was favored significantly more by liberals than by conservatives. In a related vein, Williamson (2008) found a statistical association between individuals' tendency to identify as conservatives and their residence in auto-dependent counties with new housing stocks, although he was careful to note that the causal direction of this relationship was unclear. The latter study is of particular interest since it suggests that the political left and right differ not only in their policy opinions about compact development, but in their own living choices. Similarly, three of the four pairs of tradeoffs examined by Lewis and Baldassare (2010) dealt with personal preferences about what type of neighborhood environment the respondent wanted to live in; only one of the survey questions addressed itself to a policy question about government intervention (infill efforts by localities). In short, *liberals and conservatives seem to differ in consumption preferences regarding land use, not just in public policy preferences.*

For proponents of smart growth, these ideological cleavages are a problem, since

they detract from the implied notion that society will achieve substantial consensus on this set of reforms once the public becomes more fully informed. For social scientists, however, the liberal-conservative split on compact development represents an intellectual puzzle, not merely a practical political problem. The puzzle is, first, that ideology is associated with preferences about where or how to live, not simply with preferences about government policy. Second, even if we narrow the scope of the issue to opinions on land-use policy, it is not obvious why traditional, dispersed patterns of suburban development should be seen as the “conservative” position. After all, the heavy hand of government intervention has contributed heavily to the dominance of the traditional suburban pattern, through such mechanisms as density restrictions, single-use zoning, minimum lot sizes and setbacks, height limits, government-insured mortgages, and subsidized highway construction and maintenance (Danielson & Doig, 1982; Jackson, 1985; Dreier, Mollenkopf & Swanstrom, 2001; Hayden, 2004; Beauregard, 2006). Indeed, Levine (2005) argued that sprawl and a lack of clustered development result largely from distortions of the market introduced by local government land-use regulation. Talen and Knaap (2003) similarly found that the forces restricting smart growth in suburbia primarily involved excessive local land-use regulations. By comparison, allowing for denser, clustered, mixed-use development might be considered the free-market alternative.¹

Thus, one traditional cleavage associated with the left/right distinction – the view of government’s proper role in regulating private economic actors – does not seem to align with liberal versus conservative positions on land use. What might be some alternative explanations for the left/right split on compact development? If we view

compact development primarily as an expression of sustainability concerns, then liberals' traditionally stronger preference for environmental values (Dunlap, Xiao, & McCright, 2001) may structure their opinions on land-use issues as well. However, some aspects of the smart-growth program and New Urbanism (for example, promotion of inner-city development, or new design standards such as form-based zoning) are less obviously connected to environmentalism. Moreover, Lewis and Baldassare (2010, p. 233) found in a multivariate analysis that survey respondents' stated preference for environmental protection over economic growth was not a significant predictor of their attitudes on compact development.

Another possible explanation for liberal/conservative differences involves material self-interest. In this view, conservatives may defend single-use, auto-oriented development because they tend to be white homeowners who already seemingly benefit from this type of growth pattern, and may be supporting what they view as being in their financial or status interests. However, a majority of Americans live in owner-occupied, single-family dwellings (Bennefield & Bonnette, 2003), and this likely means that a majority of liberals, or at least a plurality, live in such environments as well. Moreover, the empirical studies noted above controlled statistically for such characteristics as home ownership, income, and race, and nevertheless found that political ideology exerted an independent influence on opinions of compact development. In addition, some conservative-leaning groups, including certain business and real-estate interests, might be expected to profit from the intensification of older centers, land-use mixing, and densification promoted under the smart-growth banner. Indeed, the free-market faith in the power of "creative destruction," whereby market forces are allowed to take their

course, would suggest allowing developers to introduce high densities and mixed uses into low-density or single-use neighborhoods if the market supports it.

Thus, the likely suspects – views on government intervention, environmentalism, or self-interest – do not easily account for why conservatives tend to disfavor compact development while liberals tend to embrace it. Rather, an alternative explanation seems in order.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: MORAL INTUITIONISM

Perhaps the flaw in each of the proposed explanations above is the implicit assumption that liberal/conservative differences on land use must derive or flow from a broader, coherent set of issue positions and views of policy – that is, a political ideology. Fifty years ago, however, Converse (1964) famously concluded from his empirical work on public opinion that people’s policy preferences and political views seemed fleeting, inconsistent, and often incoherent; in short, most Americans were simply not politically sophisticated enough to really have an ideology, in the way that social scientists generally conceive of it. Converse’s dismal assessment raised substantial doubt about the classic rationalist model of voting, in which people first determine their own views on issues, compare those views to the positions of the candidates and parties, and then support the party or candidate closest to their own views. Later generations of public opinion researchers suggested an intermediate perspective between the demanding rationalist model and Converse’s allegation that citizens hold “nonattitudes.” These scholars argued that although average citizens may not have constructed an abstract, fully-formed ideology, their policy preferences are nevertheless constrained in meaningful ways by

“core values,” such as conceptions of equal opportunity or individualism (Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2001).

Some contemporary research in public opinion and political psychology suggests a considerably less rationalist view on how people’s issue positions relate to their ideology and vote choices. In this perspective, individuals tend to decide which general political “club” they feel most aligned with or socially congruent with (e.g., liberals, Republicans, libertarians), and then mold their views on specific policies or controversies to comport with the position that “their side” takes in the debate. As columnist David Brooks (2004) has summarized this line of research, “Once they have formed an affiliation, people bend their philosophies and their perceptions of reality so they become more and more aligned with members of their political tribe.” In this view, partisan “hearts,” or what we might term intuitions, trump the rationalism of reasoning “minds” (Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2004).²

Writing in a different disciplinary tradition and using different methodologies, a growing number of social psychologists have developed profound insights about the origins of individuals’ worldviews and how these worldviews affect orientations toward policy issues and social relations. In seeking to understand how humans wrestle with decisions and conflicts, this emerging perspective, sometimes called *social intuitionism*, draws upon laboratory experiments, brain imaging, and content analysis of texts and speech. These scholars conclude that humans’ decisionmaking and exercise of reason are intimately intertwined with the *emotional* centers of the brain, and that we frequently substitute impressions, feelings, and prototypes for difficult choices without realizing it (Kahneman, 2011; Fiske, 2011). In short, what Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman (2011)

calls “fast” thinking usually trumps “slow” cognition, which is more rigorous, rational, or considered.

Psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2007, 2012), calling his approach *moral intuitionism*, relates this mode of thinking to the ways that the political left and right approach the social world. Looking at evidence from societies around the world, Haidt and his colleagues show that all groups draw upon the same several sets of fundamental intuitions about what is good and bad. These five “moral foundations” are labeled as Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity. However, the moral intuitionists demonstrate that liberals and conservatives weigh these moral foundations differently. Drawing on Internet questionnaires completed by tens of thousands of individuals from many nations, as well as laboratory evidence, Haidt and colleagues show that those on the political left tend to heavily prioritize care, the prevention of harm to others, and fairness. By contrast, conservatives, while still valuing care and fairness, give much more emphasis than liberals to other moral impulses: *purity and sanctity*, which deal with the need to protect the body, the family, and the social group against contamination or degradation; *loyalty*, which concerns ingroup identification and patrol against betrayal; and *authority*, or the upholding of traditional, ordered patterns and hierarchies (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009).³

Each of the five moral foundations, the intuitionists argue, emerged in human groups because each is useful from an evolutionary standpoint (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). Particularly during the times when *homo sapiens* lived in bands of hunter-gatherers, natural selection probably favored those individuals and groups who, for example, sought to avoid contamination (e.g., rotting meat, excrement), who remained

vigilant against subversion and betrayal, or who exercised care and nurturance for others in the group (Haidt, 2012). Studies even suggest that these moral impulses have a physiological manifestation, as we might anticipate if we view the impulses as evolutionarily useful. The preferences become somewhat “pre-wired” into the human psyche, but particular moral impulses may affect some individuals much more than others. For instance, in experimental studies, individuals who rate highly on the Purity/Sanctity dimension tend to show more physiological evidence of disgust in reaction to particular visual stimuli. Further, individuals’ feelings of disgust tend to increase the severity of their moral judgments (Schnall et al., 2008; Erskine et al., 2011). And importantly for the current analysis, disgust sensitivity is higher among conservatives than nonconservatives (Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Smith et al., 2011).

Additional research in social psychology indicates that moral worldviews are linked to personality traits. Most notably, liberals tend to score significantly higher in Openness to Experience (neophilia), which is one of the “big five” traits measured in standard personality inventories (Jost et al., 2003; Verhulst et al., 2012). There is also evidence, although weaker, that the personality trait of Conscientiousness is associated with political conservatism (Jost et al., 2003; Carney et al., 2008). As one group of authors summarizes the “consistent and converging” research on this topic:

[P]ersonality differences between liberals and conservatives are robust, replicable, and behaviorally significant, especially with respect to social (vs. economic) dimensions of ideology. In general, liberals are more open-minded, creative, curious, and novelty seeking, whereas conservatives are more orderly,

conventional, and better organized (Carney et al., 2008, p. 807).

Some analysts view conservatism (particularly on social issues) as a type of “motivated cognition,” in which a conservative orientation satisfies certain psychological needs for an individual, such as reduction of anxiety or of fear (Jost et al., 2003) and a provision of order and certainty (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 35). A variety of psychological variables have been shown to be associated with political conservatism, including not only lack of openness to experience, but also death anxiety, fear of threat and loss, a distaste for ambiguity and uncertainty, and a need for order, structure, and closure (Jost et al., 2003). Verhulst, Eaves, & Hatemi (2012), reporting on studies of twins, suggest that personality traits such as Openness to Experience do not “cause” political ideology, nor vice versa; rather, some underlying genetic factor helps to shape both personality and political ideology. However, one need not embrace a genetic explanation for behavior in order to accept the importance of intuitive, near-automatic judgments and reactions to stimuli.⁴

Another set of analysts suggest that people’s political ideologies reflect their mental models of proper family structure, with liberals tending toward a “nurturing parent” metaphor while conservatives tend toward a “strict father” metaphor (Lakoff, 2009; McAdams et al., 2008). In this perspective, too, those on the political right tend to gravitate toward social arrangements that they see as promoting or protecting order and authority structures, whereas liberals prefer arrangements that nurture individual potential and personal autonomy. In congruence with the parenting metaphors, survey respondents who indicate that they hold strict (rather than nurturing) attitudes toward child-rearing practices tend toward distinctive positions on a number of policy topics, particularly

social issues such as gay rights and issues concerning military toughness (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). These statistical associations persist even after controlling for ideological self-placement and political party identification.⁵ As one psychologist summarized a large body of evidence, “conservatives seem to specialize in the in-group, avoiding risk, endorsing hierarchy, preferring tradition, supporting familiar values, and prioritizing family allegiance” (Fiske, 2011, p. 70).

Overall, the view of social or political attitudes that emerges from the intuitionist perspective is one in which “flashes of positive or negative affect emerge before rational considerations do” (Jones, 2011, p. 5). Rather than considered *positions*, these deep-seated moral intuitions possess a quality of automaticity – they are more akin to *predispositions*. Individuals may subsequently offer or articulate (even to themselves) reasons for their views, but these justifications are often after-the-fact fabrications invented to put an attractive, rational-looking veneer on a judgment that emerged more from the gut. Or as Haidt (2012, p. 48) puts it, “moral reasons are the tail wagged by the intuitive dog.”

HOW THESE MORAL INTUITIONS MAY RELATE TO LAND-USE PREFERENCES

I hypothesize that these moral intuitions, deeply held but varying in strength across individuals, help explain why liberals and conservatives view compact development so differently. In the mental map of the political left, for example, mixed-use, walkable neighborhoods would be favored, not primarily through a lens of environmentalism, but rather due to their association with the variety of experiences and

excitement that dense and urbane spaces frequently offer. Liberals might also view infill and transit-oriented development as ways to prioritize fairness and prevent harm toward residents of older centers. For those on the political left, moral outrage is directed at the way that suburban sprawl protects the already advantaged, cloistering the wealthy in newer housing, better school systems, and safer areas with higher tax bases, while other members of society are unjustly relegated to resource-poor, environmentally despoiled, and high-crime older neighborhoods.

People on the political right, by contrast, are more likely to oppose compact development, as we have seen. This opposition arises, I suggest, due to conservatives' fear of a radical upending of what has become the traditional or status-quo development pattern (the Authority impulse). Their views are also activated by disgust at the potential for disorderly mixing of land uses and social activities, which might be viewed, under the Purity impulse, as a form of contamination. (Here, think of the possibility of bars or tattoo parlors close to residences and schools.) Conservatives' karma-like sense of moral dessert (Haidt, 2012; Fiske, 2011, pp. 68-69) provides justification for the spatial separation of high- and low-status groups. In this view, the insertion of lower-cost housing into single-family, suburban neighborhoods would reward "people who don't want to work" ("takers") by allowing them to escape their less-pleasant environment, while the costs of this change in land-use patterns would be inflicted unjustly on hard-working homeowners ("makers").

In addition, conservative individuals' preference for orderliness and tendency toward conformity (Feldman, 2003; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) may incline them to prefer controlled, "nice" suburban residential environments where everything is in its

proper place. One potentially relevant study shows that self-described conservatives tend to differ from liberals in the way they keep their personal environments; the study examined office employees' workspaces and college students' bedrooms (Carney et al., 2008). Conservatives' bedrooms tended to have significantly more visible cleaning items (e.g., laundry basket, ironing board) and organizing elements (event calendars, postage stamps) than those of liberals, whereas liberals' bedrooms had a wider variety of books and music albums. Regarding office workers, independent coders (who did not know the self-reported ideology of the subjects) tended to rate the workspaces of conservatives as more conventional, old-fashioned, and unstylish than liberals' workspaces. These nonverbal behaviors may signal design preferences that are also relevant to views about neighborhoods and the built environment.

Psychological research also repeatedly demonstrates that people tend to form judgments about what is "typical" not from base rates and statistical regularities, but instead by focusing on vivid events and magnifying their likelihood; Kahneman (2011) refers to this tendency as the "representativeness heuristic." Similarly, people often tend to use exemplar cases to stand in as prototypes for what is expected of the behavior of a larger group, even though the exemplar cases are usually atypical (Lakoff, 2009). A notorious example is the mythical "welfare queen" who is used as a stand-in for all recipients of public assistance. Because of these types of simplifying heuristics, liberals who answer a survey question about low-density, car-oriented, single-use suburban neighborhoods may quickly form a mental image of a bland, socially homogenous, stultifying, monotonous bedroom community. Conservatives who hear survey questions about high-density, mixed-use, transit-oriented neighborhoods may quickly bring to mind

images of a disorderly, noisy, crime-ridden, graffiti-scarred slum.

To sum up, my hypothesis is that those on the political *left* support mixed-use, dense, and transit-oriented neighborhoods because of the high value they place on notions of personal autonomy and openness to experience, their need for stimulating and creative environments, and their lower degree of identification with conventional social norms. For those on the political *right*, opposition to compact development and preference for traditional suburban patterns should be related to conservatives' concern with purity and their heightened sense of disgust, their tendency to vigilantly monitor their environments for perceived threats, and their high identification with conventional social norms. In addition, conservatives' preference for order and neatness, stability, and ingroup loyalty all suggest a favorable attitude toward single-use, auto-oriented suburban environments and wariness of the unpredictability and diversity of mixed-use urban environments.

I am not arguing that moral intuitions and personality traits are the *only* reasons for left/right differences in attitudes toward land-use patterns. There may well be other reasons why liberals and conservatives have different neighborhood preferences; among these might be the previously discussed environmental values and perceptions of self-interest, but also other, difficult-to-measure tastes, such as preferred types of physical activity, of shopping or entertainment, or a simple desire to reside amongst others of similar political outlook. Nevertheless, my expectation is that holding ideology constant, residents' moral intuitions and related personality traits contribute importantly to their attitudes regarding compact development.

ILLUSTRATIVE QUALITATIVE ACCOUNTS

There has not been any systematic or large-N research designed to examine the connections between moral intuitions or personality traits and attitudes toward urban development.⁶ It is not difficult, however, to find fragments of empirical material – *illustrations* might be a better word than *data* – that vividly support the notion that views about the built environment are connected to personal conceptions of order, impulses for purity and sanctity, or ingroup loyalty.

Perhaps most colorfully, in recent years it has been reported that Tea Party groups bitterly opposed the Obama Administration’s Sustainable Communities program, which gave grants to support smart growth efforts in local communities. These conservatives saw Sustainable Communities “as the soft launch of a socialist-inspired U.N. takeover of America’s government” (McMorrow, 2011; see also Farrell, 2010), thereby expressing an Ingroup/Loyalty impulse.

Commentators writing for popular audiences sometimes portray people with a passion for authority or orderliness, on the one hand, and for carefully controlled neighborhood environments on the other (e.g., Brooks, 2008). For instance, Garreau’s *Edge City* (1992) described how residents of suburban retirement communities in Arizona formed a large, well-armed, volunteer public-safety posse to patrol for crime while also helping to operate homeowner associations (HOAs) that stringently enforced rules about the upkeep of properties and the paint color of houses. McKenzie’s more scholarly book, *Privatopia* (E. McKenzie, 1994), similarly highlighted how the quest to create a defended, predictable suburban realm often results in the strict and rigid enforcement of rules and standards by HOAs.

In a penetrating ethnographic study of one HOA neighborhood, Maher (2003) described a “landscape of suburban fear” in which residents of a quiet, low-crime subdivision in Irvine, California, considered gating their community. Maher’s interviews with residents suggested that their anxiety and desire to “fortress” the neighborhood arose because of the unpredictability of social changes they saw as emanating from dense and diverse nearby cities such as Santa Ana. Residents acknowledged their neighborhood’s very low crime rate, but sought to protect its perimeter against (primarily Latino) outsiders; without a wall, they anticipated, there would be more “strangers” entering the neighborhood with “bad” cars, “rusty and scruffy looking,” in one resident’s estimation (Maher, 2003, p. 764). This portrait evokes the conservative moral values of Ingroup/Loyalty (outsiders invading the neighborhood) and Sanctity/Purity (a concern with possible contamination), as well as the personality predisposition toward neatness and orderliness.

Similar sentiments arise in Weitz’s (2008) study of a suburban neighborhood’s response to a municipal proposal for enhanced public transit. A neighborhood circulator (NC) had been proposed; the NC was a mini-bus that would provide a small-scale, subsidized public transit option through a primarily single-family residential area to connect with commercial areas. Weitz used content analysis of the written public comments that neighborhood residents submitted to the municipal government regarding the proposed NC. Although most of the comments were supportive, familiar themes emerge from Weitz’s analysis of the comments of the proposal’s opponents. First, despite the inherently local-serving nature of an NC, many objections centered on the notion that unwanted outsiders would use the NC to enter the neighborhood. Automobile

reliance was seen as the norm, and opponents had trouble imagining anyone like themselves utilizing the circulator. Note the impulse toward conventionality, or as Weitz (2008, p. 169) described it, “the belief that a society constructed around automobiles is both best and a given.” Second, fears of social disorder linked to outgroups were apparent in the comments of some opponents: “[O]pponents warned that the NC would bring ‘homeless/riff-raff,’ ‘the wrong kind of people,’ ‘undesirables,’ ‘bums and drunks,’ ‘indigents,’ or ‘outside elements’ to their neighborhoods” (Weitz, 2008, p. 164), including at least one complaint that the circulator would draw illegal immigrants. These comments evoke not only ingroup bonding against a perceived external threat, but also purity concerns. The latter are particularly evident in some cases where “opponents expressed concern that the NC would provide sexual predators with access to child victims” (p. 165) or “would enable their children to travel to [nearby] cities without parental consent” (pp. 167-68).

Much of the literature on suburbia focuses on the effort to achieve separation from city environments and urban residents (Jackson, 1985; Hayden, 2003). However, efforts to avoid social mixing and unpredictable environments may also be important elements in structuring social relations *within* central cities. For instance, cultural critic Mike Davis (1992, p. 260) poked fun at conservative perspectives on urban public spaces as arising from a fear of the “democratic intoxications, risks, and undeoderized odors” of authentic city life. In this passage, he raises both the activation of disgust (“odors”) and the threat to authority and order (“democratic intoxications, risks”) that moral intuitionists have described as characteristic of the conservative predisposition. In reaction to such fear and disgust, the conservative project in Los Angeles, according to

Davis, has been to militarize the downtown, providing fortress-like security to office and retail complexes frequented by upper-status workers and consumers. Meanwhile, lower-status outgroups, particularly the homeless, were shunted into separate zones deprived of amenities (such as L.A.'s infamous Skid Row district) and left to fend for themselves (Davis, 1992).

Evidence of moral intuitions about compact development, albeit fragmentary, can also be gleaned by examining unscripted commentary on growth issues and controversies by members of the general public, particularly comments made in protest or opposition to specific compact-development proposals. Consider, for example, the comments posted online in reaction to a newspaper article about a proposed mixed-use development in a suburban portion of the Memphis area (S. McKenzie, 2007). The plan was billed by proponents as smart growth-inspired. One commenter, "Stevejoe," wrote that the development would not be "anything the citizens want or need." Rather, he said:

Could it be that developers just want to pour concrete and collect rent? Build-it-and-they-will-come may make a good movie plot, but in our case, who's coming? This may all be conjecture, but remember the wise observation of Cheech & Chong: "it looks like dog (poop); smells like dog (poop); tastes like dog (poop); must be dog (poop)."

Stevejoe invokes anxiety about the unpredictability of who or what might arrive after construction of the infill project ("who's coming?"), along with annoyance toward the betrayal (by developers who just want to collect rent) of a presumed ingroup ("the citizens," "in our case") in favor of unnamed outsiders. Who or what might come, Stevejoe evidently fears, will result in defilement (the opposite of purity), as he raises the

disgust emotion by referring to excrement. Another commenter on the same zoning controversy, “AppalachianAmerican,” similarly draws upon impulses of disgust, authority, fear, and moral boundaries in voicing concerns about mixed-use development:

There are reasons why traditional zoning laws separate residential from commercial development. It may be great to live within walking distance to restaurants but who wants to live with the rats? It may be great to have nearby shopping but who wants to see the "smash & grab" thieves running through your backyard?

Of course, these types of empirical sources are very unsystematic. And we cannot know whether the individuals objecting to the proposed infill development or the NC transit service were political conservatives. Even if they were not, however, the key point is that these cases show a set of underlying moral impulses – purity, authority, and protection of the ingroup – structuring opposition to compact development. These moral impulses, studies show, are associated with a tendency to self-identify as conservative (Graham et al., 2009). But I argue that it is not simply policy reasoning derived from ideological principles that generates opinions of compact development; it is also the affect or emotion that individuals feel toward a compact, mixed-use, transit-accessible environment, the image or prototype of which activates deep-seated intuitions.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS USING SURVEY DATA

To investigate this hypothesis further, I draw upon the 2007 Southwest Poll by the Institute of Social Science Research at Arizona State University, a survey described and analyzed in Lewis and Baldassare (2010). This phone survey of a random sample of

1,013 adults living in four southwestern states (Arizona, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas) included three questions, described above, about tradeoffs between compact development and traditional suburban development; these are the first three survey items listed in the note to Figure 1.⁷

The goal of the current analysis is largely exploratory: to examine whether aspects of the moral identity of survey respondents are associated with their stated preferences about compact development, once we control for other relevant individual characteristics. To test the hypothesis, ideally one would field a survey that includes questions relating directly to respondents' moral foundations or personality traits. However, the Southwest Poll was not fielded for this purpose; rather, it was an omnibus survey with questions that addressed a wide variety of different topics, questions that had been submitted separately by several different investigators. The three questions listed in Figure 1 were the only survey items directly related to land use or urban development.

There were no questions directly geared at measuring the moral foundations of survey respondents. However, I located three survey items submitted by other investigators that seem to tap, at least indirectly, into moral intuitions, particularly Ingroup/Loyalty or Authority/Respect, or that involve personality characteristics such as Openness to Experience. For want of a better term, I call these “morally-relevant variables” in the discussion below. The variables are:

Low sense of national belonging. One battery of questions dealt with respondents' sense of belonging or identification with various geographic communities. The relevant part of the questionnaire read:

I'd like you to rate your sense of belonging in the following places. For each

place, rate your sense of belonging using a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means you have “no sense of belonging” and 10 means you have “a very strong sense of belonging.” . . . The United States of America

Most respondents gave very high ratings to their sense of belonging in the U.S., with three-quarters of the weighted sample giving a score of 9 or 10. I created a dummy variable set equal to 1 for individuals who gave a belonging score of 5 or below (8% of the weighted sample), and 0 for those giving higher scores. My supposition is that individuals willing to give a low score to their sense of belonging as Americans would tend to score relatively low on the Ingroup/Loyalty moral foundation, as they are not so easily induced by patriotism or national pride to view themselves as “belonging” to America. In addition, these individuals may have low levels of social conformity and high levels of Openness to Experience, as they are not bound to their current nationality and possibly may view themselves as “citizens of the world.” I thus expect the low-belonging variable to be associated with favorable views toward compact development.

Lack of religious identification. Respondents were asked, “What, if anything, is your religion?” I created a dummy variable set to a value of 1 for respondents who answered that they were atheist, agnostic, or had no religion (12% of the weighted sample), and 0 for all others. Religiosity, at least in the recent U.S. context, has been linked to conservatism, whereas individuals with a secular, nonreligious worldview tend disproportionately to be political liberals (Fiorina et al., 2006, pp. 128-134). More importantly, one can surmise based on prior empirical studies that individuals who identify themselves as lacking any religious affiliation will tend to put a low priority on the Purity/Sanctity foundation (which is linked to conceptions of the divine) and on the

Authority/Respect foundation (which deals with obedience to recognized sources of authority) (McAdams et al., 2008; Balzer, 2011). Nonreligious individuals may also tend toward low levels of social conformity and high levels of Openness to Experience, as they do not wish to bind themselves to one particular religious tradition. Accordingly, I anticipate that lack of religious identification will be associated with favorable views toward compact development.

Anti-immigration sentiment. As part of a battery of questions regarding attitudes on immigration, respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with this statement: “I would be willing to pay more for goods and services such as groceries, housekeeping, childcare and entertainment to keep out undocumented immigrants.” I code those who strongly or somewhat agree with this statement (48% of the weighted sample) as 1; those who somewhat or strongly disagree, “neither agree nor disagree,” or don’t know are coded 0. The wording of this question is useful in that, like the land-use questions, it forces respondents to make a tradeoff; they must indicate not just a generalized displeasure with illegal immigration, but a willingness to pay to keep unauthorized foreigners away. This question has obvious relevance for the Ingroup/Loyalty foundation (patrolling boundaries and guarding against subversion) and the Authority/Respect foundation (as authoritarians tend to view undocumented immigrants as “lawbreakers plain and simple”; see Hetherington & Weiler (2009, p. 168)). For individuals who are highly nationalistic or who hold ethnic prejudice against immigrant groups, it is also possible that the desire to keep out immigrants is connected to conceptions of Purity/Sanctity. For these reasons, I anticipate that the willingness to pay to keep out immigrants will be associated with unfavorable views toward compact

development.

Each of the three morally-relevant variables tap into certain aspects of personality and moral worldview, such as Openness to Experience, Purity/Sanctity, and Ingroup/Loyalty. Nevertheless, these are clearly indirect proxies, at best, for survey respondents' moral foundations or personality. Given the absence of direct measures in extant surveys about land-use preferences, these measures are used because of convenience, and thus conclusions about moral intuitions in the analysis below should be treated as suggestive rather than definitive. It is hoped that, in combination with the qualitative accounts discussed earlier, the quantitative analysis will allow triangulation among imperfect sources of evidence, suggesting the flavor and potential of how moral intuitions might translate into views on urban development patterns.

In the statistical analysis discussed below, logit regression is employed because the dependent variable in each regression is dichotomous: For each tradeoff question, a response indicating a preference for the compact-development alternative is coded 1, whereas a response indicating a preference for traditional single-use suburban development is coded 0. I use multivariate models that are essentially identical to those reported for the Southwest survey in Lewis and Baldassare (2010), except that the morally-relevant variables described above are added, one at a time, as independent variables. The other alteration is that in the regressions dealing with the sense of belonging to the United States or with anti-immigration sentiment, I omit foreign-born respondents from the analysis. These questions likely provoke a different moral framing for residents born outside the United States. For example, many immigrants may have a relatively complex sense of national identity. However, immigrants are included in the

models involving the “nonreligious” variable.

All of the regressions control for political ideology (using an indicator variable for self-described conservatives). *Thus, the effect (if any) of the morally-relevant variables will be one that is independent of the respondents’ political ideology.*⁸ Although I do not view the hypothesized influence of the moral variables as necessarily competing with the effect of ideology, I anticipate that the moral variables will have some predictive capability even when controlling for ideology.

In the discussion below, I focus attention on the estimation results for the morally-relevant independent variables and the political ideology variable. I will say little here about the 20 additional independent variables that measured respondents’ life-cycle characteristics and presence of children in the household, demographic background and socioeconomic status, perceptions of their current community, and state dummy variables. The theoretical reasoning for including these variables as potential predictors of attitudes toward compact development is detailed in Lewis and Baldassare (2010), but in the current analysis they function simply as controls. The signs and significance of each of these control variables in the current analysis is similar to that reported in Lewis and Baldassare (2010: 229).⁹ As in that study, I weight the observations in the model using the survey weights provided by the survey organization, which make the survey sample quite representative of the adult population of the four Southwestern states (Lewis & Baldassare, 2010, pp. 223-24).

DISCUSSION OF MULTIVARIATE RESULTS

Low sense of national belonging. The first set of results, in Table 1, indicates that individuals who report feeling low levels of communal belonging to the United States tend to be significantly more approving of living in a small house with a small yard and short commute, as compared to a large house and yard with a long commute. They also tend to favor mixed-use neighborhoods where they can walk to stores and services (as opposed to solely residential, driving-oriented neighborhoods), although this relationship is weaker. Contrary to expectations, “low belonging” individuals tend to be unfavorable toward living in a high density, transit-oriented neighborhood (rather than a low-density, car-oriented environment), though this association is only marginally significant. It is possible that the appearance of the off-putting “D word” in that survey question (which unlike the other two, overtly mentions “high density”) causes these respondents to frame the transit-oriented development concept in a different way than they conceive of the other two tradeoff questions. (Moreover, being densely housed amidst other Americans, for respondents with low ingroup identification, may not sound especially appealing.) Otherwise, however, this set of results conforms to expectations. The openness to experience that is a likely characteristic of these low-nationalism respondents may render them favorable toward the variety of mixed-use areas, and their relatively low allegiance to social conformity may mean that they are not drawn toward the traditional American ideal of large-lot suburban living.

[Table 1 about here]

Lack of religious identification The estimates in Table 2 indicate that secular individuals – respondents who report atheism, agnosticism, or no religious identification

– are more likely to favor all three of the compact-development alternatives over the traditional suburban options. Results are strongest for the high-density, transit-oriented alternative, but are statistically weaker (with significance at the 10% level) for the small-house/short-commute, and mixed-use alternatives. The relatively low impulse toward social conformity that probably characterizes religious nonbelievers, as well as their probable low inclination toward the Purity/Sanctity and Authority/Respect foundations, may lead them to tolerate and even enjoy the diversity, unpredictability, and occasional disorder of dense, mixed-use environments where car ownership is unnecessary. These may be individuals for whom the “undeodorized odors” of city life are not a problem, but rather represent a type of authenticity that they embrace.

[Table 2 about here]

Anti-immigration sentiment. I anticipated that those willing to pay to exclude undocumented immigrants tend to be drawn toward the Ingroup/ Loyalty and Authority/Respect moral foundations, which I expected to be negatively associated with views toward compact development. Two of the three regressions reported in Table 3 bear out this expectation. First, those who are more opposed to undocumented immigration are significantly less likely than others to want to live in a small house with a small yard (but a short commute). Second, anti-illegal immigration respondents are also disinclined to live in a walkable, mixed-use neighborhood. However, the relationship between immigration views and the high-density, transit-oriented neighborhood preference, while signed in the expected direction, lacks statistical significance. Overall, though, one may infer that the concern that the anti-illegal immigration respondents have for security and their wariness of intrusion may incline them toward living in detached,

large-lot homes, and in neighborhoods separated from nonresidential uses. One might speculate, as well, that these individuals feel more secure transporting themselves to work or shopping in a (lockable) automobile, rather than engaging in the seemingly more vulnerable act of walking.

[Table 3 about here]

In each of the models, conservative ideology also continues to be associated with a low probability of preferring the compact development alternative. Thus, the morally relevant variables certainly do not replace ideology, but they importantly supplement it. They may also go some partial way toward explaining ideology's importance. Compared to models without the moral variables, the inclusion of the moral variables reduces the effect size and significance of ideology, at least slightly. To consider the substantive impact of ideology and the moral variables, Table 4 shows the changes in the probability of a pro-smart growth response when values of the key independent variables are changed from 0 to 1. These estimates reveal that the effect sizes of the moral variables are generally of similar magnitude to the effect sizes of ideology, with each concentrated around a 10% change in probability. The moral variables exceed the ideology variable in influence for the "small house, short commute" preference.

[Table 4 about here]

CONCLUSION AND AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite the efforts of smart growth proponents to portray the move toward compact development as a commonsense reform that everyone can embrace, it is increasingly clear that there is a fairly substantial left/right political cleavage on views

toward the built environment. Further, this polarization in views is not easily explainable by merely pointing to different ideological positions about the role of government in regulating the economy. Indeed, liberals and conservatives differ in the types of built environments they say they would like to *live in*, not merely in their preferences for public policies toward land use. Rather, I have suggested that these differences in attitudes toward compact development become more understandable in light of the fundamentally different moral intuitions that liberals and conservatives have about the social world, as well as the different personality dispositions of these two groups.

Although systematic data are not available, I have provided public opinion evidence that connects three views on the built environment to three proxy measures for moral foundations and personality traits. Of the nine regressions, seven had statistically significant results pointing in the hypothesized direction, one went contrary to theoretical expectations, and one was indeterminate. Ethnographic and impressionistic evidence from other studies and accounts also suggests patterns that support my hypothesis, with concerns for purity, social order, and ingroup loyalty apparently connected to preferences for separated land uses and auto-oriented suburban development.

Ideally, future studies would be geared toward collecting and analyzing data so that analysts would be able to plumb this hypothesized relationship more systematically. A specialized opinion survey on this topic not only might ask about a wider variety of land-use, neighborhood, and transportation preferences, but also about a broader set of political and moral viewpoints. For instance, some research suggests that social conservatism, but not economic conservatism, is predictive of views on compact development (Handy et al., 2008), a finding that receives some indirect support from this

analysis, and one that connects with political psychologists' findings of a link between sociocultural conservatism and authoritarian attitudes. Ideally, an opinion survey on attitudes toward the built environment would include questions on deep-seated, "pre-political" inclinations, such as views on family life and disciplining children (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; McAdams et al., 2008; Lakoff, 2009), social interaction styles (Carney et al., 2008; Jost et al., 2003), or sensitivity toward disgust (Schnall et al., 2008). Including Haidt and colleagues' lengthy Moral Foundations questionnaire within the survey (difficult in a phone survey, but more practical in an Internet- or paper-based questionnaire) would allow one to test in a more direct way whether people's moral foundations are closely linked to their preferences about the built environment. Including a personality inventory within a survey would allow for more direct tests of the links between personality traits and attitudes toward urban development.

A particularly intriguing possibility would be to embed an experiment within a survey on land-use preferences. Psychological research indicates that certain frames, images, or narrative scenarios can prompt or heighten concerns such as purity, authority, or ingroup loyalty, often eliciting more conservative-leaning responses to subsequent survey questions (Jost et al., 2003; Westen, 2007). So, for instance, including elements in a survey script that prime such concepts as mortality and death anxiety, danger or security threats, or contamination and disgust might be expected to provoke instincts to fortress, inclining experimental subjects to report more negative views toward mixed-use or high-density neighborhood patterns. This type of research might be able to suggest to smart-growth proponents (and opponents) the types of frames, images, and narratives that they must manage in order to make people receptive to their position.

Moving beyond the relatively artificial format of surveys and lab experiments, which typically deal with hypothetical situations, it also would be enlightening to examine the unscripted comments of proponents and opponents of compact development in the context of specific controversies and proposals, whether at public hearings, in online forums, or in focus groups. Content analysis could then be used to characterize the particular sorts of moral and pragmatic arguments that are raised by proponents and opponents.¹⁰

In sum, this type of research offers a potentially exciting new way to understand how humans interact with the urban environment. Urbanists have long held that “place matters” (Dreier et al., 2001). Places, especially those officially demarcated by jurisdictional boundaries, serve as more than simply neutral containers (Weiher, 1991; Oliver, 2001). Rather, places serve to sort, concentrate, and aggregate people, social groups, building types, and activities, in the process making these places more distinctive to us. In turn, this distinctiveness likely influences the way individuals perceive and identify with (or against) particular neighborhoods and cities. Understanding the way that personality traits covary with the lived urban experience, and with perceptions of neighborhoods, could be of foundational importance to understanding how people judge and make decisions about where and how to live. Scholars have begun to investigate how ideological allegiances may affect people’s self-selection into particular places when they migrate (Cho, Gimpel, & Hui, 2013; Walks, 2006), and it is possible (if perhaps overly ambitious) to envision a research program that would integrate longitudinal, individual-level data on personality, political ideology, moral intuitions, migration decisions, and place characteristics.¹¹

Urbanists have long concerned themselves with the “legibility” of cities to their inhabitants and visitors (Lynch, 1960). But the hypothesis raised in this article suggests that when liberals and conservatives view the city, they do not see the same reality. Accordingly, academic urbanists, who tend to lean toward the political left (for reasons that ought to be apparent from the discussion of moral foundations above), may not recognize the moral impulses that conservatives feel (Haidt & Graham, 2007) toward compact, urbane neighborhoods. In short, people’s very different views of the good city, or the good suburb, may well emerge as part and parcel of their very different intuitions about the well-lived life.

ENDNOTES

¹ One should not carry this argument too far, however, to cover all elements of the compact-development reform program. For instance, strict urban growth boundaries and restrictions on subdivision of greenfield land are supported by many in the smart-growth movement, but these policies involve substantial government restrictions on private actors. Heavy subsidies for mass transit would similarly be viewed with disfavor by devotees of the market, although many neoclassical economic analyses do support tolls on driving in order to price the externalities created by auto use.

² In an alternative, somewhat similar perspective, (dis)approval of particular policies is shaped by the affect or heuristics that citizens hold regarding the recipients or target population of the policy (Sniderman et al., 1986; Lawrence, Stoker, & Wolman, 2013), with such heuristics often reflecting a broader process of social construction (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).

³ Haidt and his associates' work on moral foundations and social intuitionism has gained widespread visibility and acceptance in social psychology and beyond, with a large and growing number of academic citations (though for critiques, see Saltzstein & Kasachkoff, 2004; Suhler & Churchland, 2011).

⁴ Aside from any genetic factors, social psychologists and neuroscientists stress the importance of a variety of environmental influences in influencing rapid judgments and unconscious behaviors (Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). Indeed, it is believed that through the process known as neuroplasticity, environmental influences can become imprinted in thinking patterns through, for example, repetition or associative learning (Doidge, 2007).

⁵ Hetherington and Weiler (2009, pp. 48-49) use a battery of questions on child-rearing practices to construct a scale of what they refer to as “authoritarian” tendencies.

Authoritarians are seen as a subgroup of conservatives (see also Altemeyer, 1996) who have a “mind-set [that] is a kind of secular or ecumenical analogue to a fundamentalist religious worldview. . . an outlook that would reject multiple, layered interpretations in favor of an outlook motivated by the belief that too much slack and uncertainty in rule application could yield disorder, chaos, and social breakdown” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 35). Such an outlook might well extend to views of preferred neighborhood land-use patterns.

⁶ However, some limited quantitative evidence (analysis of variance) from one study suggests a possible link between personality traits and choice of neighborhood, with results that are broadly congruent with my hypotheses. Schwanen and Mokhtarian (2007, p. 192) find that denser, more diverse neighborhoods tend to attract people who think of themselves as adventurous or seekers of variety, as well as loners. By contrast, “the pattern for the organizer factor is the reverse of the loner factor,” suggesting that those with a penchant for structure and organization tend to be attracted to traditional suburban settings.

⁷ Because of “don’t know” answers and refusals to answer certain questions, as well as the exclusion of foreign-born respondents from some of the analyses below, the number of observations in the regressions is about one-third smaller than the full survey sample.

⁸ In two out of three cases, there are highly significant pairwise correlations between political ideology and the morally relevant variable. However, the correlations are not so high as to create serious concerns about collinearity in the model. The correlation of

conservatism with each of the variables is: Low U.S. belonging (-.02, n.s.), Respondent not religious (-.14, $p < .001$), Would pay to keep out immigrants (.18, $p < .001$).

⁹ These control variables include the following dummy variables representing the respondent's status: age 18-24, age 25-34, age 35-44, age 55-64, age 65 and over (omitted age category is 45-54); female; black; Hispanic; household income of less than \$35,000/year, household income of greater than \$75,000/year (omitted category is \$35,000-\$74,999); bachelor's degree or higher educational attainment; renter; moved to current address within prior 12 months; reported dissatisfaction with current community's transportation system, reported dissatisfaction with supply of decent and affordable housing; reported crime victimization during prior 12 months; and indicators for residence in Arizona, New Mexico, and Nevada (omitted category is Texas). In the logit regressions where we focus on respondents' religious identification (Table 2), a control variable for foreign-born respondents is also included. Foreign-born respondents are excluded from the other two sets of regressions.

¹⁰ This type of approach would be analogous to Graham, Haidt, and Joseph's (2009) content analysis of religious sermons, in which they found that (conservative) Southern Baptist ministers tended to use words and phrases associated with the moral foundations of Authority/Respect and Sanctity/Purity, whereas (liberal) Unitarian Universalist sermons were much higher than Baptist sermons in use of wording related to Harm/Care and Fairness/Reciprocity.

¹¹ The interplay between these factors may well be iterative. For example, the experience of living in a particular kind of place (e.g., single-use residential and auto-oriented versus diverse and walkable) may dispose residents toward particular perspectives on social life,

the self, and the role of government. These views, in turn, may influence self-selection in migration to new neighborhoods (Walks, 2004; see also Gainsborough, 2001). It is also possible that wrenching neighborhood transformations experienced by some residents (e.g., white ethnics in city neighborhoods that underwent rapid racial change and disinvestment in the 1970s) may shift their perspectives about favored land-use patterns (e.g., toward a desire for suburban fortressing) (Rieder, 1985).

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FIGURE 1
Degree to Which Liberal Support Exceeds Conservative Support for Compact Development Alternatives

Notes: Wording of questions in the surveys: (1) “Would you choose to live in a small home with a small backyard, even if it means you have a short commute to work? Or would you choose to live in a large home with a large backyard, even if it means you would have a long commute to work?” (2) “Would you choose to live in a mixed-use neighborhood where you can walk to stores, schools, and services? Or would you choose to live in a residential-only neighborhood, even if it means you have to drive a car to stores, schools, and services?” (3) “Would you choose to live in a high-density neighborhood where it was convenient to use public transit when you traveled locally? Or would you choose to live in a low-density neighborhood where you would have to drive your car when you travel locally?” (4) “Which comes closest to your view: Local governments should steer growth to already developed areas of your region in order to preserve open space and encourage the use of public transit; or, local governments should allow growth in undeveloped areas in your region in order to avoid high density and traffic congestion.” Item (4) was not included in the survey of Southwestern states.

TABLE 1**Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Low National Belonging, Ideology, and Control Variables**

	<u>Prefer small house/yard, short commute</u>	<u>Prefer mixed- use, walkable</u>	<u>Prefer dense, transit-oriented</u>
<u>Moral Identity and Ideology</u>			
Low sense of U.S. belonging	1.094 (.367)**	.608 (.335)#	-.609 (.361)#
Conservative ideology	-.423 (.184)*	-.557 (.182)**	-.630 (.201)**
<u>Other Characteristics</u>			
Children in household	-.321 (.210)	-.040 (.215)	.063 (.229)
Age 18-24	-.566 (.323)#	-.175 (.321)	1.160 (.350)**
Age 25-34	-.380 (.311)	-.203 (.309)	.413 (.336)
Age 35-44	-.657 (.291)*	-.149 (.286)	.501 (.318)
Age 55-64	.522 (.332)	-.521 (.309)#	.932 (.346)**
Age 65 and over	.003 (.333)	-.001 (.325)	.012 (.389)
Female	.684 (.185)**	-.123 (.181)	-.152 (.195)
Black	.833 (.338)*	1.494 (.352)**	1.639 (.362)**
Hispanic	-.188 (.231)	.829 (.231)**	.695 (.237)**
Income below \$35,000	.092 (.250)	.212 (.244)	.791 (.254)**
Income of \$75,000 or more	-.516 (.218)*	-.329 (.213)	.241 (.234)
B.A. degree or higher	.053 (.212)	.402 (.207)#	.426 (.225)#
Renter	-.467 (.252)#	-.072 (.252)	.326 (.264)
Recent mover	-.264 (.190)	.261 (.187)	.441 (.200)*
Dissatisfied with transport	.002 (.189)	.590 (.186)**	.095 (.199)
Dissatisfied with affordable housing	-.524 (.195)**	-.258 (.192)	.068 (.201)
Recent crime victim	.058 (.227)	-.221 (.221)	-.509 (.248)*
Arizona resident	.557 (.237)*	.194 (.229)	.500 (.239)*
New Mexico resident	.669 (.374)#	.281 (.367)	.081 (.381)
Nevada resident	.098 (.374)	.385 (.357)	.200 (.389)
Constant	.734 (.314)*	-.128 (.304)	-1.875 (.365)**
<u>Fit Statistics</u>			
McFadden pseudo R-sq.	0.112	0.095	0.152
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq.	0.187	0.159	0.247
% of 0's correctly predicted	60	64	73
% of 1's correctly predicted	68	62	59
Prob > chi-sq.	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	657	656	661

Notes: #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01. Logit regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Foreign-born survey respondents excluded. Omitted categories: age 45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables.

TABLE 2**Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Lack of Religious Affiliation, Ideology, and Control Variables**

	<u>Prefer small house/yard, short commute</u>	<u>Prefer mixed- use, walkable</u>	<u>Prefer dense, transit-oriented</u>
<u>Moral Identity and Ideology</u>			
Lack of religious affiliation	.418 (.253)#	.454 (.241)#	.706 (.249)**
Conservative ideology	-.316 (.175)#	-.504 (.173)**	-.810 (.190)**
<u>Other Characteristics</u>			
Children in household	-.416 (.191)*	.008 (.196)	.135 (.207)
Age 18-24	-.419 (.300)	-.176 (.300)	.863 (.328)**
Age 25-34	-.311 (.293)	-.202 (.294)	.330 (.320)
Age 35-44	-.519 (.273)#	-.039 (.271)	.422 (.301)
Age 55-64	.456 (.317)	-.391 (.298)	.882 (.335)**
Age 65 and over	.001 (.327)	.037 (.320)	.059 (.383)
Female	.561 (.171)**	-.012 (.169)	.057 (.181)
Black	.593 (.317)#	1.280 (.325)**	1.519 (.339)**
Hispanic	-.133 (.212)	1.080 (.217)**	.673 (.220)**
Foreign-born	.588 (.298)*	.181 (.290)	-.230 (.300)
Income below \$35,000	.361 (.225)	.133 (.219)	.546 (.227)*
Income of \$75,000 or more	-.553 (.206)**	-.394 (.203)#	.172 (.225)
B.A. degree or higher	-.071 (.202)	.253 (.199)	.459 (.216)*
Renter	-.742 (.222)**	.279 (.223)	.365 (.230)
Recent mover	-.081 (.176)	.036 (.175)	.465 (.187)*
Dissatisfied with transport	.002 (.180)	.545 (.179)**	.001 (.191)
Dissatisfied with affordable housing	-.540 (.188)**	-.335 (.188)#	.087 (.198)
Recent crime victim	-.025 (.220)	-.193 (.217)	-.438 (.241)#
Arizona resident	.322 (.227)	.166 (.222)	.561 (.229)*
New Mexico resident	.531 (.365)	.250 (.362)	.204 (.367)
Nevada resident	-.164 (.359)	.037 (.348)	-.174 (.395)
Constant	.792 (.304)**	-.133 (.296)	-1.923 (.354)**
<u>Fit Statistics</u>			
McFadden pseudo R-sq.	0.094	0.091	0.141
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq.	0.164	0.155	0.237
% of 0's correctly predicted	61	62	73
% of 1's correctly predicted	68	61	57
Prob > chi-sq	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	702	703	707

Notes: #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01. Logit regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Omitted categories: age 45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables.

TABLE 3**Neighborhood Preferences as a Function of Anti-Immigration Sentiment, Ideology, and Control Variables**

	<u>Prefer small house/yard, short commute</u>	<u>Prefer mixed- use, walkable</u>	<u>Prefer dense, transit-oriented</u>
<u>Moral Identity and Ideology</u>			
Would pay to keep out undocumented immigrants	-.525 (.184)**	-.421 (.180)*	-.187 (.194)
Conservative ideology	-.337 (.185)#	-.500 (.183)**	-.599 (.201)**
<u>Other Characteristics</u>			
Children in household	-.351 (.209)#	-.079 (.215)	.090 (.228)
Age 18-24	-.488 (.323)	-.164 (.320)	1.150 (.350)**
Age 25-34	-.389 (.313)	-.231 (.311)	.382 (.337)
Age 35-44	-.610 (.289)*	-.133 (.286)	.466 (.317)
Age 55-64	.511 (.332)	-.532 (.309)#	.886 (.347)*
Age 65 and over	.030 (.335)	-.028 (.326)	.068 (.388)
Female	.598 (.182)**	-.200 (.180)	-.133 (.193)
Black	.774 (.335)*	1.461 (.350)**	1.643 (.362)**
Hispanic	-.258 (.233)	.768 (.233)**	.613 (.237)*
Income below \$35,000	.113 (.248)	.238 (.243)	.767 (.252)**
Income of \$75,000 or more	-.566 (.217)**	-.361 (.213)#	.277 (.233)
B.A. degree or higher	-.019 (.211)	.353 (.207)#	.441 (.224)#
Renter	-.454 (.251)#	-.048 (.252)	.392 (.264)
Recent mover	-.258 (.190)	-.247 (.188)	.412 (.199)*
Dissatisfied with transport	.118 (.187)	.673 (.186)**	.063 (.197)
Dissatisfied with affordable housing	-.537 (.195)**	-.248 (.193)	.085 (.202)
Recent crime victim	.095 (.229)	-.191 (.222)	-.487 (.249)#
Arizona resident	.490 (.237)*	.147 (.230)	.505 (.239)*
New Mexico resident	.506 (.372)	.138 (.371)	.073 (.382)
Nevada resident	.077 (.374)	.352 (.357)	.233 (.389)
Constant	1.096 (.331)**	.176 (.318)	-1.842 (.378)**
<u>Fit Statistics</u>			
McFadden pseudo R-sq.	0.110	0.098	0.150
McKelvey & Zavaina pseudo R-sq.	0.186	0.162	0.242
% of 0's correctly predicted	61	64	73
% of 1's correctly predicted	69	61	60
Prob > chi-sq	0.000	0.000	0.000
N	658	657	662

Notes: #p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01. Logit regression coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. All variables are dichotomous. Foreign-born survey respondents excluded. Omitted categories: age 45-54, middle-income, Texas resident. See Table 4 for effect sizes of key variables.

TABLE 4
Changes in the Estimated Probability of Favoring Compact Development, as
Morally Relevant Variables and Ideology Change

	<u>Dependent Variable</u>		
	<u>Prefer small house/yard, short commute</u>	<u>Prefer mixed-use, walkable</u>	<u>Prefer dense, transit-oriented</u>
<i>From Table 1 models:</i>			
Low sense of U.S. belonging	0.21	0.13	-0.11
Conservative ideology	-0.09	-0.12	-0.12
<i>From Table 2 models:</i>			
Lack of religious affiliation	0.09	0.10	0.14
Conservative ideology	-0.07	-0.11	-0.16
<i>From Table 3 models:</i>			
Would pay to keep out undocumented immigrants	-0.11	-0.09	-0.04
Conservative ideology	-0.07	-0.11	-0.11

Notes: Values reported are the estimated changes in the probability of a pro-“smart growth” response on the dependent variable as the independent variable is changed from 0 to 1 and all other independent variables in the model are held constant. Values are calculated using the "margins" command in Stata 12.